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  THE WORD LAW AND MATTERS LEGAL 
             Mitsukuni YASAKI 
                Law and Its Limits
                   T w o 1 I l ustrations 
              Diagrammatical Expianation
        The Word of Law andTheWord about Law 
                  Law and Its Limits 
   It sounds familiar for us to conceive law as the limited one 
distinct from the non-legal, like morality, etc. The socalled le-
gal positivism in particular stands for this concept of law. The 
typical example is offered by H.L.A. Hart in its characterization 
as the second criterium of the legal positivism: "that there is no 
necessary connexion between law and morals, or law as it is and 
law as it ought to be".1) 
   Even though notstanding an the positivist point of vie w,it has 
been generally repeated, that to maintain such a distinction has be-
come the tradition for certain purposes in legal practice as well 
as in legal theory since the modern period. Then, for what pu-
rposes ? In understanding them, careful notice should be paid an 
the historical differences between the common law and civil la-
w Systems in their administration which are apt to prevent us 
from putting them together. But, several common conditions, sti-
ll may well be accounted as such purposes, that is, to prevent 
judge's arbitrary decision -as well as to exclude arbitrary legi-
   * Professor f General Jurisprudence, Department of Law, Osaka University. J. D. 
Tokyo University, 1968. 
    1) H. L. A. Hart, The concept of law, 1961, p. 253. Cf. W.J. Uren, Criteria of l
egal positivism, ARSP, LYI, No. 56, 1969, pp. 189 ff.
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slation under the narre of morality, so and so, in other words, 
to secure citizen's liberty and right in the better condition. lt 
is, partly, due to these purposes that modern great writers su-
ch as like Montesquieu, C.Beccaria, J. Bentham, A. Feuerbach stre-
ssed the idea of m echanical application of la w through syllogi-
stical process. The similar situations still remain today, and the 
distinction see ms necessary to m aintain in a considerable degree. 
But, the more getting close to present, the more it becomes di-
fficult to do so in the original style. Mr. Justice 0. W. Holmes' 
idea would provide us with a good example. 
   As it's well known, opposite types of opinions have spread ar-
round from the interpretation of his idea. Against the older vi-
ew criticizing its morally nihilistic, or morally indifferent aspe-
ct, the defense for his idea has been offered according to the 
following way of reasoning : Holmes indeed gave an emphasis 
an studying law apart from the non- legal ( including morality). 
lt does not follow from this emphasis that he disregarded mo-
ral elements in law. On the contrary, both in "The Path of The 
Law" and " The Common Law", he definitely spoke of the fact of 
moral influence to law in regard to the process of law- making 
and law- functioning 2 )
    Nevertheless, in the case of study of law, law students are 
to pay their attention to the law itself. To cite a phrase, he 
spoke with an emphasis : " The first thing for a business - like 
understanding of the matter is to understand its limits, and the-
refore I think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a 
confusion between morality and law. ........ When I emphasize the 
difference between law and morals 1 do so with a reference to a 
single end, that of learning and understanding the law. For that 
purpose you must definitely master its specific marks, and it is 
   2) O.W. Holmes, The common law, 1881, Belknap press ed., 1963, pp. 128,107f .
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for that I say you for the moment to imagine yourselves indi-
fferent to other and greater things ".3) S o far, he certainly stre-
ssed the m eaning of the distinction, but he did so only to this 
extent. 
  At first glance, such a defense is plausible. Further questions, 
however, may be raised in the following way : 1 What does it me-
an to learn and understand, that is, to study the law ? It is truly 
the law - the subject of study which has been made and admini-
stered through the influence of the non -legal (including moralityl, 
Then, could be the law strictly or purely distinguished from the 
other even an the level of the study ? This is the first question. 
2 The study of law will be continued an the theory level. Theory 
and practice concerning law, as else where, theoretically are to be 
separated. But this is not easy to do in practice , and yet , still 
less easy in the common law countries where, as it is said, rou-
tine of theory of law is more deeply connected with the legal pra-
ctice. So, the second question again would be raised that one may 
find any feed-back relationship, rather than the distinction betwe4 
en the law and the non-legal. In this respect, the Limits of law 
does not see m so easy to m aintain as the defenders argued. B ut this 
is simple acknowledgment of how is situation around law coming. 
Therefore, what is essential at the moment is not merely to conde-
mn or give up the Separation, but to consider it more in detail. For 
this purpose, my main concern is, at first, to take two illustrations 
in which law and the non -legal, i . e., what is legal and what is 
not appear to be used in close connection as standards for judicial 
decisions, and then, to examine the word law according to its usages 
involved in these illustrations. 
   3) Holmes, The path of the law, 1897, in: Law and philosophy, ed. by Ed. A. Kent, 
 1970, p. 7.
28 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Na 20 
                  Two Illustrations 
The Naien-relation 
  "Modernization"of Japan, though strongly advanced since Meiji era 
(1868-)., has left considerable rooms for traditional elements ba-
sed an customs in the community. The Naien-relation is one of the-
m in the field of law. To cite Kuki 's proper term, "Naien is the re-
lation between man and woman whichh is not legally admitted to be 
the lawful marriage"4)for the failure of the registration as reque-
sted by the Family Registry Act. Indeed, there has been a rema-
rkable distance between the custom and the legal provision. Acco-
rding to the former, man and woman become the formal couple by 
celebrating their marriage whether or not performing the registra-
                         5) « 
tion. According to the latter, no marriage, without registration'°/ 
One of the urgent problems was presented as to the damaltes rende-
red when Naien was breached wrongly. To construct the provision 
literally, no legal protection should be given to Naien ? But , how 
about the reality of practice ? The main trend of the judicial de-
cisions changed from rejecting to giving legal protection. It 
has been established since 19156)that Naien is a precontract (or 
quasicontract ) to the marriage, so the damage caused by its brea-
ch is to be treated an the ground of a non-performance of obliga-
tion. In 1958, in addition to them, it was held possible, by the Su-
preme Court, ) to make claim for damages caused by unreasonable 
breach of the Naien-relation an the ground of a tort. All that has 
been established by paying a deep considerati,on to the social custo-
  4 ) T. Kuki , Naien : One problem inJapanese marriage law, Osaka Univ. L. Rev., 
No. 12, 1964, p. 9. 
  5 ) The mainprovision of Japanese Civil Code says  "The lawful marriage comes into effect in consequence of the registration requested by 
  the provision i the Family Registry Act " ( § 739) . 
  6 ) Judgment of Jan. 26, 1915, Daishin i  ( former Supreme Court) .
21 A Collection ofCivil Daishin in Cases 49. 
  7 ) Judgment of Apr. 11, 1958, the Supreme Court. 12 A Collection ofCivil Supreme 
Court Cases 789.
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m, i e., social practice which at f irst was treated as the non-le-
gal , then taken into the framework of law by means of judicial le-
gislation or law-making, thus acquired the character, legal. 
 Riggs v. Pal mer 
 In 1889, Court of Appeals of New York held "that (defendant) E1 
mer E. Palmer and the administrator be enjoined from using any of 
the personalty or real estate left by the testator for Elmer' s be-
nefit ; that the devise and bequest in the will to Elmer be declareed 
ineffective to pass the title to him ; that by reason of the crime 
of murder committed upon the grandfather he is deprived of any inte-
rest in the estate left by him ........". 8) It is this unfortunate rase 
which originally was caused by the fact that the defendant, while 
he murdered his grandfather who made his last will to give the gra-
ndson, defendant a considerable part of his estate, claimed then the 
property. 9)The case is well known with in the common law countries, 
and it has called for serious consideration. Mr. Justice Cardozo in 
his lecture spoke of it as teaching us necessity of choice between 
possible principles for the judicial decisionl°)A. L. Goodhart made a 
remark about it because of an overstatement of the principle invol-
lved in it : that " no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his 
own wrong, or to found any Claim cpon his own iniquity, or to acqu-
ire property by his own crime' ".11)R. M. Dworkin referred to it as an 
example of the typical use of maxims, principles, standards, etc., 
in the judicial decision as well as another case of Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc12)Here, it woud be enough to mention that 
  8) Riggs et al. v. Palmer et al., 22 N. E. 191 (1889) . 
  9) idem 22 N. E. at 189. 
  10) B.N. Cardozo, The nature of the judicial process, in : Selected writings of B. N. 
C., ed. by M. E. Hall, 1947, p. 121. 
  11) A. L. Goodhart, Determining the ratio decidendi of a case, Yale L. J., vol. XL, 
No. 2 , 1930, p. 166. 
  12) R. M. Dworkin, Is law a system of rules ?, in : Essays in legal philosophy, ed. 
by R. S. Summers, 1968, pp. 35 ff. Nt Yasaki, Philosophy of law and sociology of law, 
1972, pp. 137 ff.
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several standards offered possibilities to make decisions from each 
different point of view about this Gase, that is, statute, judicial 
precedent, and common law maxims which will be referred below. 
                Diagrammatical Explanation 
 The Gases above will show how complicated situations arround law 
are. They, in turn, make an influence even to our usage of the word 
law. Whenever the word law is used, cited, and criticized, it often 
has been given a role to designate too many things each of which, 
being conceptually to be separated one another from the analytical 
point of view, are put together without any reference to some diffe-
rence between ordinary and theoretical usage of the word. one 
of the causes of controversies concerning the word law. So 1 
shall describe, next, certain characteristic usage of the word law 
in connection with their designation by means of two diagrams. Both 
of them include four different stages classification of which may not 
be delimited to four, but is made as a matter of convenience. 
Diagram 1 . This is an illustration Diagram 1. 
of the field of matters legal. The square ~`o ~`~ TJA 
styled diagram is to be utilized for two o~o aJ 
purposes, i.e., for understanding both e Qa 
of the law-making and law-functioning 
process. The law-making process in an 
ordinary sense proceed from A-*B-C 
-~D . A. Certain patterns of behavior 
has been established within a community ti~ 
of certain scale. B. It is not only follo- 4. o~QP+~s                                                  l
1 oro 
wed generally, -C-. but also felt or ~r 
accepted as binding or valid. D. It is sometimes said that certain 
legal lule about certain pattern of behavior is established in this 
way an the one hand, and the ordinary word law is applied to this
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ordinary matters, especially the rule an the other. 13) Seeing in its 
funetioning process, the word law (D) is now related with and rea-
ct to other three directions-, A. B. C., while originally is conditio-
ned by them. (B . C . themselves may have the Same functioning to 
others, which is not mentioned here) To swi tch our focus of atten-
ntion f rom Diagram 1. to Diagram 2. , there spread around somewhat 
different prospects of the legal world. Diagram 2. 1-SAvA 
v Diagram2. This is an illustra- 3w°0` e 
                                                                                           ~,ka 
tion of what the word law designates. 4 `ti4E 
The twofold processes are also the ca 14) 
se with this diagram. The matters legal 
which constitute Diagram 1. as a whole, 
is here put together to the stage I. 
How the law-making process proceeds 
                                                 ~ ro from there would be more concretely 1 `3 
                                                                  !~, d e                                                                  ~r 1yQ~g 
clarified by means of the two cases or gaf s ~¢ 
illustrations above mentioned, concerning customary , law, statutes, 
and judicial precedents. 
Cu stom 
  The stage I - matters legal. What are customs in a community 
will differ according to the different practices of each communities 
or countries. For example, it has been the custom in the western 
countries to give a tip for taxi-driver but not in Japan. This may 
be the case with the problem of the Naien- relation Said above. 
Whatever the scope of patterns of behavior identified as customs, 
however, they are accustomed to be called customary law in an 
ordinary sense. By the way, the ordinary usage of the word is not 
always the saure with legal treatment of these customs as law. 
The stage II. appears thus as a screening stage. Screening them 
   13) We may perhaps find at this Diagram a prototype of various ideas, such as like 
 those of Ehrlich's lebendes Recht, H_ art's primary rules of obligation. 
   14) K. Llewellyn, A realistic jurisprudence - the next step, in : Jurisprudence, 
 1962, p. 5.
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through legislation or judicial decision to legal rules becomes an 
important task at this stage. One example of their legislative tre-
atment is as follows : 
    "A custom, not violating the public order or good mores, has 
   the Same legal validity, as legal, enactment does, in regard to 
   matters, to which any provision of laws or regulation permits to 
   it to relate, or matters to which no provision of laws or regula-
   tion is to relate . (Hörei, § 2 ) 
  The judicial precedent based an a series of judicial decisions 
needs not to repeat as it's indicated before.Legal rules concerning 
customs,whether provided by Code or presented in precedents, are 
naturally to be applied and operated in legal practice. In that occa-
sion, the legal dogmatics, in other words, constructive approach 
plays an important role between them. The stagelll . The role of le-
gal dogmatics15)in a considerable degree is to clarify meanings le-
gal concepts involved in legal rules according to their context and 
in the light of socio - legal practice, then, eventually to eliminate 
from or add to them some meanings. Here could be seen both,certa-
in constructive or juristic approach and the word law (customary) 
corresponding to that approach. The stage 1V. Legal theory. It be-
comes major subject at this stage how theoretically to use the wo-
rd customary law, either to reserve it only at the stage II., or to 
include the stagelll. and 1., besides II. 
Again, Riggs v. Palmer 
  The stage I. One may perhaps assume several features of matters 
legal in this way, that is, a) patterns of social behavior to make 
a will, b) patterns of social behavior about and against murder,c) 
common sense styled judgment of a) and b) , d) the ordinary word. 
law, etc. The stage II. Legal standards in treating the Gase are 
   15) 1 borrowed the word legal dogmatics from the german notion Rechtsdogmatik. 
It might be a bit unfamiliar for common law countries. But, to refer Holmes, The path 
of the law, p. 7.
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 the statute an will an the one, hand,. and the,judicial precedent 
 (understood broadly) an the other. The stage 111. The judicial tourt, 
using the technique of "rational interpretation"and eviating itself 
~from Owens v.Owens, reached to' the conclusion, that the defendant 
 was not entitled by standing an the "general fundamental maxims 
 of the common law ( No one shall be permitted ••......)  - I t will 
 immeadiately remind readers both, the way of, judicial law 
 making- or legislation and wider aspects of the word law as7 so 
 far presented as its material standard. The stage IV. The same Pro-
blem will be raised in regard to what extent the word law theoreti-
cally is to be used to. 
  One of the most interesting stage within Diagrams Land 2.should 
be the stage III. Whenever certain legal rule, whether customary or 
of precedent, statutory, is treated in reference to certain casesit 
originally or provisionally expected to come, no sharp interstice be-
 tween this stage and the others could appear. By contrast, if ce-
rtain legal rule (e g ., statute an will ) is treated in reference to 
cases at least unexpected to come or put aside, then, several inno-
vations may have to be devised and introduced, such as like " inte -
rstitial law-making "16)To be sure, the process of administration 
or operation of law always brings before us somewhat new factors, 
e.g., deviation from judicial precedents, such and such, in which 
 feed-back relation of any sort would be apparent between the sta-
ge III. and 1., which may moreover catch our interest. 
          The Word of Law and The Word about Law 
 The problem of law, as far as the usage of its word is concerned, 
is reduced to what shall be understood under the word of law, or 
the word about law. Whether to limit it to the stage II, or to extend 
  16) Cardozo, op. cit., pp. 134, 146.
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it to the others, too, has been seriously disputed betw een partici-
pated users, and each of their assertions proposed as the well-kno-
wn subject of " definition of law ". This is really an important su-
bject to be pursued in some proper way. The main purpose in this 
artiele, ho w ever, is not to provide for certain definition of law, but 
merely to clarify several topics of the usages of the word from the 
theoretical point of vie w( including philosophy of law and sociology 
of law) at the stage IV. 
    To simplify someaspects of definition Diagram 3. 
   of law, it may well be permitted to su-
   mmarize as follows. According to Dia- ISS e~A4A 
   gram3.., some scholars use the definiti-
   on (III) solely at the stage II. , while the 
   other does not contend this w ay, buttry 
   to make definition of things themselves 
   at the stage 1. At first glance, there 
   appears a great distance betweenthem. 
   Is it really so? Partly, not . The formet 
   perhaps doing so only for the purpose of 
   "definition", does not lead to the disregard of things, and vice 
   versa. M y concern is m erely to give a notice an the backgroud of 
   the matter : As we know, there are three components about it,
   that is, speaker - language-designata17) To make a definition, a 
   user of definition( or speaker) uses it in referrence to words 
   or language) from his o wn aspect according to which he finds in 
   things an interest to do so, which is expressed in Diagram.3.as 
   legal " doctrirle " ( including both, legal theory and legal dogma-
   tics) . 
 The simple distinction at first should be noted here, that is, the 
word of law and the word about law both of which will perhaps se-
rve for the purpose above as an illuminating example. 
    17) R Carnap, Introduction to semantics and formalization of logic, 1959, pp. 9 ff.
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      The word of Iaw 
         The first attempt is to use the word of law as to the limited sta-
        ge II., Diagram 2, in other words, to apply it to legal rules relati-
        vely formulated, authorized, and articulated. As to their kind, one 
        carr readily refer to those of statutes and customary law in the ci-
       vil law system, and moreover those of judicial precedents in the
        common law system. As to their style of statement, they may well
       be classified as pointed out by Michael and Adler 18) both into gene-
       ral legal statement and elementary legal statement ( such as like 
       legal and judicial decision) . 
            Further notice shall be paid at this stage 
          a) The word legal rules is ordinarilyused " to refer to some 
           element of regulation which governs our actions and affairs, and
          which involves something more than mere moral reprobationif we
          step outside permitted limits, however these limits may be inte-
           rpreted "19) 
          b) The word legal norms may well be used in this respect 
           for the word legal rules in order to clarify some normativeor
          prescriptive character underlying them. The limited use of the
           word legal norms does not lead to the disregard of the presuppo-
          sition that there still remain wider areas of legal rules (e.g., 
           power conferring rules ) , besides of ordinary image of legalno-
           rms ( e. g., criminal statutes backed by sanction ) . 
          c) The word of law here does not only mean individualegal ru-
           les, but their aggregation character of which has become so gre-
          at issue that jurisprudents have been invited to discuss in an
          alternative way, either to imply it strictly closed as one set
          of legal rules or open sided and subject to change, and which 
          prima facie shall be implied as loosely connected one. 
               18) J. Michael -M. Adler, The trial of an issue of fact : 1., ColumbiaL. Rev., 
            1934, p. 1250. 
               19) J. D.Finch,Introduction  legal theory, 1970, p. 12.
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The word about Iaw 
 The second attempt is to use the word about law in a wider sense 
than the word of law, in order to extend its meaning not only to 
the stage II. , but to the stage I . and III. - the word about law, 
therefore, is used to refer to wider matters legal than the word of 
law does. The necessity of this usage will be apparent espec-
cially in switching a focus of reference to the legal dogmatics re-
lated to the administration and functioning of law at the stage III2.°) 
For example, the general , fundamental maxims of the common law, 
the rule or principle of the rational interpretation presented in Ri-
gge v. Palmer. and the traditional customs, or the judicial pre-
cedents deduced from them in the Naien cases were given a role 
of material standards for judicial decision whether to ascribe 
right , title, or duty, obligation, etc. to each party , or not . To put 
it this way, the word about law will include maxims, principles, 
standards, and policies, which have been strongly asserted by R. 
M. Dworkin as entitled to be law.21) 
  Those who are intended to conceive law in a broader sense, may 
propose to use the word of law as overall the word about law by 
making the former include the stage 1. and III., besides II. By co-
ntrast, those who aim at strictly to conceive law within the limitted 
stage II., may reject to identify the two originally distinct usages. 
lt is very plausible, viewed in this light, that the problem of two 
usages of the word law and their designation would be exhausted in 
the socalled" verbal question ", or the question of " iastes " each 
users may prefer to, as pointed out by G.Williams.22) 
   20) cf. "Permissive "legal sources in Hart, )p• cit., p. 247. R. Sartorius, Hart's 
concept of law, in: More essays in legal philosophy, ed. by Summers, 1971, pp. 153. 
156. 161. E. H. Taylor, Jr., H. L.A. Hart's concept of law in the perspective ofameri-
can legal realism, The Modern L Rev., vol. 35, No. 6, 1972, pp. 618 ff. 
   21) Dworkin, op. cit., pp. 41 ff . cf. articles involved in The YaleL. J. vol. 81, No. 5, 
1972. 
   22) G. Williams, Language and the 1 aw- IV, The Law Quarterly Review, vo 161, 
1945, pp. 384ff.
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Nevertheless, it still remains to take the following considerations: 
1. To consider from what aspect of legal doctrine that problem is tre-
 ated, either from legal theory or legal dogmatics ( constructive 
 approach) . 
2. To consider, within the legal theory, either from philosophy of la-
w or sociology of law, so and so this article is written from 
 the former aspect . 
3. To be careful about varieties or differences in each field of law 
 to be considered, like law of tort or criminal responsibility. 
 Such considerations, whatever looking partial and trivial, will 
 perhaps serve for us, at first, to look at causes of the confusi-
 on about the Word law used, then, to meet demands for possible 
 ways to their resolution.
